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Abstract 
The lack of detailed implications and general failure to come to grips with 
important features of tort doctrine have been substantial shortcomings in the 
dominant positive theory framework of Holmes and Posner. I extend the dominant 
framework below to enable it to justify various intentional tort doctrines, and the 
specific form and allocation of strict liability rules within tort law. After developing 
the positive framework, I apply it to the Restatement (Third) of Tort Law. The 
theory explains many of the detailed provisions and commentary of the Restatement, 
and identifies one area in which the Restatement (Third) seems inconsistent with tort 
doctrine. I also discuss the value of positive theory as a part of the Restatement 
project. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Though at times a source of controversy, the American Law Institute 
performs an enormous public service through its Restatement projects. One of the 
initial hurdles any such project confronts is whether it should aim to clarify and 
illuminate the law, or to push the law in a certain direction. I think the Restatement 
project is most productive when it aims to clarify and illuminate rather than guide or 
control the development of legal doctrine. Efforts to guide and control risk 
producing questionable interpretations of the law, undermining the value of the 
Restatement in the long run. Fortunately, the Restatement of the Law of Torts comes 
across largely as an effort to clarify and illuminate.1 
 
I will argue below that this clarification function can be improved by 
adopting, developing, and integrating a positive theoretical framework. A positive 
theory of tort doctrine can reveal connections between rules that seem initially to be 
unrelated, suggests functions for rules that seem difficult to justify on doctrinal 
grounds, help the researcher predict the eventual tort rules adopted by courts in novel 
areas of the law, and give us greater confidence in our interpretations of the case law. 
I hope to demonstrate that a detailed positive framework can improve the 
Restatement and similar efforts to clarify tort doctrine, and should be a central part of 
the Restatement project. 
 
In order to be useful to the Restatement project a positive theory of tort law 
has to have detailed implications for tort doctrine. The lack of detailed implications 
and general failure to come to grips with important features of tort doctrine have 
been substantial shortcomings in the dominant positive framework, that of Holmes 
and Posner. I extend the dominant framework below to enable it to justify various 
intentional tort doctrines, and the specific form and allocation of strict liability rules 
within tort law. After developing the positive framework, I apply it to the 
Restatement (Third).2 The framework explains many of the detailed provisions and 
commentary of the Restatement, and identifies one area in which the Restatement 
(Third) seems inconsistent with tort doctrine. In the penultimate section I return to 
the value of positive theory as a part of the Restatement project. 
 
 
II. The Need for a Positive Theory of Tort Doctrine 
 
 
It may seem a little odd to argue for the development of a positive theory of 
tort doctrine after so much work in this vein has been published. But the two most 
successful efforts to explain tort law, that of Holmes more than 100 years ago,3 and 
 
 
 
 
1 This is especially true in the hands of its highly regarded current Reporter Professor Gary Schwartz. 
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, chs. 1-2 (Discussion Draft, 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS, ch. 3 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2000). 
3 I will refer to the chapters on tort in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
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more recently Posner,4 are incomplete in important respects. Overall I regard the 
Holmes-Posner framework as a success, and like many scholars continue to work 
largely within it. However, there are shortcomings in the framework that limit its 
usefulness as a template for the detailed analysis of tort doctrine required by a 
project such as the Restatement. 
 
Holmes provided the first positive economic theory of tort law, anticipating 
the core as well as many important components of Posner’s account. Posner, in his 
seminal paper “A Theory of Negligence,”5 asserted that “Holmes left unclear what 
he conceived the dominant purpose of the fault system to be, if it was not to 
compensate.”6 This is nonsense. While Holmes did not have the advantage of a 
century’s worth of economic theory and associated technical terminology to draw on, 
his consistent reliance on cost-benefit arguments clearly indicates that he thought tort 
doctrine aimed to minimize the costs of accidents and accident avoidance. Holmes 
claimed that legal doctrine generally accords with “convenience,”7 which is about as 
close as one could come in the late 1800s to saying “cost-minimization” or 
“economic efficiency,” especially when addressing an audience comprised entirely 
of lawyers. 
 
The core of Holmes’s framework, as well as Posner’s, is the Hand formula 
for negligence. Under the Hand formula, an actor is negligent, and therefore liable, 
if on the margin the cost of avoiding the accident is less than the cost of the accident. 
Again, the fact that Holmes did not use precisely this terminology is irrelevant, 
because his arguments are so clearly consistent with this approach. It is the habit of 
academics during a period of “normal science,” when the stakes are high precisely 
because there is so little original on the table, to make much of minor distinctions in 
terminology in order to allocate credit. Put this habit aside for the moment and 
imagine Holmes writing for a population of lawyers trained as they are today, with a 
highly developed economics literature to consult. 
 
Because Holmes believed that the Hand formula explained so much of tort 
doctrine, he found little need for a concept such as duty.8 Indeed, Holmes makes no 
effort in The Common Law to explain the various duty doctrines, even though they 
probably were more important in his day than in ours. Similarly, Holmes makes 
little effort, beyond references to “policy coupled with tradition,”9 to explain the 
function of strict liability. His brief references to strict liability suggest that he 
believed  the  cost-internalization  rationale  commonly  advanced  today  was  the 
 
 
4 I am referring to Richard Posner’s many articles on the positive economic theory of tort law, many 
of them co-authored with William Landes. The first article, and the one I will discuss in this paper, is 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972). 
5 Richard A. Posner, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972). 
6 Id., at 31. 
7 Holmes, supra note 3, at 1-2 (“The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, 
so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient...”). 
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch. 2, at 90 (citing Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. 
Rev. 652, 660 (1873) (endorsing a general duty of “all the world to all the world.”) 
9 Holmes, supra note 3, at 155. 
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purpose of strict liability, but Holmes made no effort to get into the details of strict 
liability doctrines, such as nuisance law. 
 
Posner, like Holmes, treats the Hand formula as the core of tort doctrine, and 
similarly seems to have little use for the notion of duty. However, the most 
significant shortcoming in Posner’s framework appears in his treatment of strict 
liability.  Examine his words from “A Theory of Negligence”: 
 
It is true that if you move from a regime where (say) railroads are 
strictly liable for injuries inflicted in crossing accidents to one where 
they are liable only if negligent, the costs to the railroads of crossing 
accidents will be lower, and the output of railroad services probably 
greater as a consequence. But it does not follow that any subsidy is 
involved – unless it is proper usage to say that an industry is being 
subsidized whenever a tax levied upon it is reduced or removed. As 
we shall see, a negligence standard of liability, properly administered, 
is broadly consistent with an optimum investment in accident 
prevention by the enterprises subject to the standard.10 
Posner is suggesting in this quote, as he has said at other times,11 that in the general 
context in which the negligence rule applies, imposing strict liability is equivalent to 
taxing the tortfeasor. The reason is that the negligence standard is sufficient to 
induce the actor to take cost-justified precautions. If the actor is strictly liable, rather 
than liable only if negligent, he will not go beyond the reasonable level of precaution 
that he would choose under the negligence rule, which is the level that minimizes the 
sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs. Put another way, the actor will not 
spend $2 to avoid an expected liability of $1. 
 
But a solid line of economic theory starting from Pigou12 and receiving its 
most sophisticated applied treatment to the law by Calabresi13 indicates that Posner’s 
tax-subsidy argument is probably wrong. A railroad that exercises the reasonable 
level of precaution still lets off sparks that damage the crops of farmers. These 
sparks are “external costs” or “externalities” associated with the activity of running 
railroad cars. Under the theory of externalities, optimum investment in the activity 
of running railroads is achieved only if these external costs are internalized to the 
railroad owners. Thus, as a general matter, strict liability is not an imposition that 
serves no other purpose than to tax the railroad, even in settings in which the courts 
adhere to the negligence rule. While the negligence rule ensures optimum 
investment in accident reduction, strict liability ensures both optimum investment in 
accident reduction and activity levels. 
 
 
 
 
10 Posner, supra note 5, at 30. 
11 E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 179 (4th ed. 1992). 
12 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
13 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  (1970). 
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We have a serious problem here. Under the positive framework that Posner 
has extended and developed, the general shape of tort doctrine, with negligence 
serving as the default rule and strict liability as the exception, appears wrongheaded. 
Economic theory seems as a general matter to suggest we should see strict liability as 
the general rule with negligence appearing as the exception in certain instances. 
Indeed, this basic insight motivated Calabresi’s impressive critique of the fault 
system. Calabresi, working with the same advantages in scientific capital as Posner, 
saw that the default rule suggested by the economic literature was strict liability 
rather than negligence. Why the default rule should be negligence remains 
unexplained under Posner’s framework. This is especially troubling for Posner’s 
analysis because he, like Holmes, treats the Hand formula as the theoretical core of 
tort doctrine. 
 
The Posnerian extension of Holmes’ framework runs into difficulties when 
confronting the doctrinal details of strict liability. In Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. 
American Cyanamid Co.,14 Posner focused on one of six factors in the Restatement 
(Second) § 520 test governing ultrahazardous activities: the inability to eliminate the 
risk of accident by the exercise of due care (factor (c)). Elaborating, Posner said that 
 
[s]ometimes, .., a particular type of accident cannot be prevented by 
taking care but can be avoided, or its consequences minimized, by 
shifting the activity in which the accident occurs to another locale, 
where the risk or harm of an accident will be less, or by reducing the 
scale of the activity…15 
 
Now, the problem with focusing on this element of Restatement (Second) § 520 is 
that this is always true of every accident setting. We can never eliminate the risk of 
an accident, and we can always avoid and minimize consequences by shifting and 
reducing the activity. Posner’s tendency to focus on the Hand formula leads him to 
find only one reason to divert from the negligence standard, and that is the case in 
which due care is insufficient to eliminate accidents. But that is a troubling standard 
for strict liability because it is true in all cases. So we are left still searching for a 
reason to apply strict liability in one case rather than another. 
 
I do not mean to argue that factor (c) of Restatement (Second) § 520 is 
useless. However, I do think that § 520 has to be regarded as a whole piece, rather 
than reduced to a single component. Moreover, of the components in § 520, I find 
factor (c) far from decisive in determining the appropriateness of strict liability, and 
not very helpful standing alone.  I will return to this below. 
 
A positive framework for tort doctrine should be able to explain tort doctrine 
at a rather detailed level. The best positive framework available, that of Holmes as 
extended by Posner, has several shortcomings. It has not been applied extensively or 
with much success in explaining various duty doctrines in tort law.  Nor has it been 
 
 
14 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
15 Id. at 1177. 
17 Holmes, supra note 3, at 95. 
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applied to such “specific intent” torts as assault and malicious prosecution. And it 
seems to do a poor job of explaining the allocation of strict liability rules, and 
especially doctrine in the closely related areas of nuisance and ultrahazardous 
activities.  I will set out an alternative that succeeds on these issues below. 
 
 
III. Extending the Positive Framework for Tort Doctrine 
 
 
A richer positive theoretical framework begins with three observations, most 
of them anticipated in part either in Holmes’ or in Posner’s analysis. First, as 
Holmes stressed in several instances,16 tort law rules reflect statistical generalities, as 
one should expect of default rules in general. Tort doctrine assumes individuals are 
aware of basic physical laws, so that a driver who fails to brake in time is assumed to 
have foreseen the likelihood of an accident. Owners of tigers and bears are assumed 
to have foreseen the dangers they impose on others. A homeowner has the right to 
assume that an individual who breaks into his house at night is there for a bad 
purpose, and so on. Liability rules governing conduct, such as negligence or strict 
liability, are typically based on statistical generalities concerning cause and effect. 
 
Second, externalities are prevalent; they represent the norm rather than the 
exception. I am referring both to negative externalities, costs imposed on others 
outside of an exchange setting, and to positive externalities, or benefits conferred on 
others in the absence of an exchange mediated through prices. Holmes signaled the 
importance of benefit externalization for understanding tort doctrine when he noted 
that 
 
[a] man need not, it is true, do this or that act, -- the term act implies a 
choice, -- but he must act somehow. Furthermore, the public 
generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, 
and tends to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing 
the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor.17 
 
Third, liability rules affect activity level and care level decisions – a version 
of the standard distinction in economics between substitution effects and scale 
effects. As Posner has made clear in his discussions of the choice between strict 
liability and negligence, strict liability gives actors incentives to shift the location or 
reduce the scale of their activities. The negligence rule does not have this effect 
because the actor is relieved of liability after taking reasonable precaution under the 
negligence rule. Because of the different effect of strict liability, we should expect 
strict liability to be applied in tort law when a reduction in the actor’s activity level is 
desirable. Contrary to Posner’s assumption in Indiana Harbor, the Hand formula 
does not tell us when this is the case. 
 
16 E.g. Holmes, supra note 3, at 155. 
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One additional observation is that doctrinal rules achieve at best a roughly 
optimal state. The tools provided by legal doctrine are blunt. We should not expect 
them to bring about a “first-best” outcome in which every actor has hit the optimal 
investment level on every margin. For this reason the mathematical models currently 
employed in much of the law and economics literature are often of only marginal 
relevance to tort doctrine, at least once we hit a sufficient level of detail. The 
question of interest is whether the rule components (strict  liability,  negligence, 
intent, and so on) provided in the doctrine have been put together in a way that 
minimizes the sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs relative to some 
alternative configuration of the rule components. In general (and as I will argue 
below), this appears to be true. And as a general rule, mathematical models may be 
helpful but are by no means necessary in evaluating this question. 
 
A. The Economics and Law of Activity Levels 
 
With the foregoing as background, I will set out a modified positive 
framework for tort doctrine, building on one I have referred to before as the “missing 
markets” model.18 For simplicity, let us consider the choice between negligence and 
strict liability. If, assuming reasonable care, the externalized benefits are roughly 
equal to the externalized costs connected with an activity, the negligence rule should 
apply. The reason is there is no economic case for reducing the level of the activity 
in this setting. Since the external benefits are roughly equal to the external costs, 
there is no net external (i.e., third party) harm on average associated with the actor’s 
activity when conducted reasonably. This is the context that includes most services 
provided in the market. For example, a bus running down the street on which your 
business is located externalizes risk to you, to the extent the bus may veer off the 
road and damage your store. On the other hand, the bus service also externalizes a 
benefit by bringing potential customers in contact with your business. Alternatively, 
consider the risk externalization among cars on a street. Each car, driven reasonably, 
externalizes roughly the same risk to other cars. Under a negligence rule, there is no 
net external harm imposed on a given actor when every actor drives reasonably. 
 
We can elaborate this argument by distinguishing private and social benefits. 
Actors will pursue an activity up to the point where the incremental private gain or 
benefit from the activity is just equal to the incremental private cost. For example, a 
railroad will run its trains until the marginal revenue from service is equal to the 
marginal cost, for if the marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost it will gain by 
increasing service. Society, on the other hand, has an interest in seeing an activity 
expanded up to the point where the marginal benefit to society (marginal social 
benefit) is just equal to the marginal cost to society (marginal social cost). Suppose 
the marginal revenue and marginal cost to the railroad are both equal to $10 per 
passenger-mile (or freight-mile) at the firm’s privately optimal level of service. 
Suppose that the external harm to farmers is $10 (per passenger-mile), and the 
external benefit to farmers is $10.  Since the marginal social benefit is $20 and the 
 
 
18 Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 977 (1996). 
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marginal social cost is $20, there is no economic argument for reducing the scale of 
the railroad’s activity. 
 
If, when railroads are operated with reasonable care, the externalized costs 
are substantially greater than externalized benefits, then a strict liability rule is 
appropriate against the actor responsible for the costs. Suppose the external cost to 
farmers from the railroad is $110 per passenger-mile and the external benefit to them 
is $10 per passenger-mile. At the railroad’s preferred level of service, the marginal 
social cost of rail service is $120 (the sum of $110 external and $10 private), while 
the marginal social benefit is only $20. Every additional mile of service reduces 
society’s wealth by at least $100. In this case, reducing the scale of rail service 
enhances society’s wealth. By internalizing the $110 to the railroad, a strict liability 
rule would induce the railroad to choose a lower level of service where marginal 
revenue is commensurately high. The new privately optimal level of service for the 
railroad may be one where the railroad’s marginal cost is $112 and the railroad’s 
marginal revenue is also $112.19  See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 Alternatively, if railroad cost curves are downward-sloping, the new privately optimal service level 
may be more costly at the margin. For example, the new privately optimal service level may be one 
where the marginal social cost is $130 and the marginal revenue is also $130. For the purpose of this 
discussion it does not matter whether the railroad’s cost curves are upward or downward sloping. The 
important point is that when external costs are “internalized,” which is what we observe under strict 
liability, the railroad’s service level declines. 
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The railroad’s preferred activity level under strict liability, point B in figure 1, 
is not the same as society’s best service level, which is point C. However, the 
railroad’s preferred service level under strict liability is better, from society’s 
perspective, than its preferred service level under negligence (point A). This serves 
to illustrate the point that liability rules do not necessarily achieve the optimal 
outcome, as defined within economic models. The optimal outcome would equate 
the marginal social cost of service with its marginal social benefit. But this is 
beyond the power of liability rules in many instances. The relevant question is 
whether strict liability comes closer to bringing about socially optimal activity levels 
than does negligence. 
 
From the foregoing it should be clear that strict liability is socially preferable 
to negligence whenever the external costs are substantially larger than external 
benefits. When the ratio of external costs to external benefits is roughly one, the 
negligence rule is preferable to strict liability. When the ratio is substantially greater 
than one, strict liability is preferable to negligence. When the ratio is substantially 
less than one, courts should choose liability rules that serve in effect to subsidize the 
underlying activity, by reducing the actor’s expected liability below what he would 
bear under the negligence rule. I will argue below that tort doctrine is consistent 
with these general principles, and that they help us understand many of the details of 
the intentional tort and of strict liability doctrines. 
 
B. Some Immediate Applications 
 
To begin, we hardly ever observe any tort rules that really can be described as 
strict liability, in the sense that the potential defendant acts at his peril. Perhaps the 
closest version of such a rule is observed in product liability doctrine, in the case of 
manufacturing defect. The Restatement (Second) § 402A holds the manufacturer 
liable for manufacturing defects without regard to his level of care or his activity 
level.20 However, outside of this rather special case, I am aware of no others of such 
pure strict liability. Instead, we observe rules that do not inquire into the fault of the 
defendant, but do inquire into several other issues. For example, consider 
Restatement (Second) § 520, governing ultrahazardous activities.21 Although Posner 
focused on only one of those factors in Indiana Harbor, there are six factors 
altogether in § 520. Similarly, nuisance doctrine examines a broad range of issues 
outside of the defendant’s fault. What explains the structure of the strict liability 
doctrines we observe in tort law? 
 
The strict liability doctrines we observe in tort law aim to guide courts in 
assessing whether the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is 
substantially greater than one. This explains why we see rather complicated rules for 
the most part under areas of law bearing the label “strict liability,” and why the 
simple “pure strict liability” rule governing manufacturing defects is a unique and 
special case.   This also explains why Posner’s reduction, in Indiana Harbor, of 
 
 
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402, cmt. A (1965). 
21 See infra Part D. 
23 Holmes, supra note 3, at 147-49. 
10 
 
Restatement § 520 to a single factor – whether the danger can be eliminated with 
reasonable care – is probably unwise and almost certainly inconsistent with tort 
doctrine. The Hand formula approach advanced by Posner is insufficient to explain 
the structure of strict liability rules. 
 
We can think of tort law as consisting of rules with three liability-allocating 
functions. First, there is the Hand formula, which, as Holmes and Posner have 
stressed, is properly viewed as the general default rule for tort liability. Second, 
there are channeling rules that allocated more or less liability than required by the 
Hand rule. Strict liability doctrine can be put in this category, and so can rules 
governing duty and proximate cause. These rules, as noted earlier, are based on 
statistical generalities. Third, there are inference rules that serve generally to 
minimize the likelihood of an erroneous decision. In this category fall such 
seemingly unrelated doctrines as res ipsa loquitur and rules governing application of 
the reasonable person test (e.g., to the insane, to disabilities, etc.). This is a 
somewhat arbitrary categorization, since I could have just as well said that every 
legal rule aims to minimize the expected costs of legal errors. However, rather than 
approach every legal doctrine as an inference rule, I have begun this discussion by 
analyzing the welfare implications of alternative liability rules (strict liability and 
negligence). To remain consistent with this approach, I will treat the inference 
problem within a relatively narrow scope. 
 
Armed with the framework presented above and these functional categories, I 
think one can march through much of the Restatement (Second or Third), finding 
along the way better explanations for some of the doctrines and connections between 
seemingly unrelated rules. Indeed, one could use the framework to reorder the 
doctrines according to functional rather than formal legal categories. More 
important, the framework is capable of revealing areas in which the Restatement fails 
to clarify tort doctrine. I will follow the general outline of the Restatement (Third) 
draft while sparing the reader of all of the details. 
 
 
IV. . Positive Theory and the Restatement (Third) 
 
A. Intentional Torts 
 
Restatement (Third) § 1 tells us that an “actor’s causation of harm is 
intentional if the actor brings about that harm either purposefully or knowingly.”22 
Since we cannot know with certainty whether another person has acted “purposefully 
or knowingly,” the determination of intent is a matter of inference. Proof of 
purposeful or knowing conduct must, as Holmes stressed,23 hinge on whether the 
facts are such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct would 
lead to harm, or that the probability of harm flowing from his conduct was very high. 
Viewed  in  this  way,  the  determination  of  intent  is  not  very  different  from  the 
 
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch.1, supra note 2, at § 1. 
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determination of negligence. Since defendants will not walk into court and admit 
intent or negligence, both require proof of facts that would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude that the defendant acted under the requisite mental state. 
 
The Restatement (Third) provides in the Comment to § 1 that the “concept of 
intent is rendered important by the presence of a general rule … that imposes 
liability on defendants who intentionally cause physical harm.”24 In other words, 
intentional harms often give rise to strict liability. The interesting question is why. 
The notion that intent is just an advanced or more pernicious form of fault seems 
inadequate. There are important instances in which an actor can harm another 
intentionally without having to worry about strict liability.  For example, if I open up 
a convenience store next door to yours and sell the same goods for one dollar less, I 
must know that I will put you out of business. But I will not be held strictly liable 
for your loss, and probably not liable at all. Moreover, the intent cases reveal two 
levels of intent: “general intent”, or intent to carry out the act, and “specific intent,” 
or intent to harm. Only the former level of intent is required in most cases, which 
suggests that intent is generally no more pernicious as a form of fault than 
negligence. 
 
The liability rules governing intentional conduct serve as examples of 
channeling rules designed to reduce the scale of certain activities. For those 
activities for which the ratio of externalized costs to externalized benefits is greater 
than one, intentional conduct generally gives rise to strict liability. Another 
distinction to incorporate in this set of cases is that between high and low transaction 
cost settings. Harmful expropriations in low transaction cost settings should be taxed 
in order to discourage efforts to evade the market. Most examples of intentional torts 
giving rise to strict liability fall under these categories.25 
Consider examples 2 and 3, from the Restatement:26 
 
2. Wendy throws a rock at Bill, someone she dislikes, at a distance of 
100 feet, wanting to hit Bill. . . . Wendy’s aim is true, and Bill is 
struck by the rock. 
 
3. The Jones Company runs an aluminum smelter, which emits 
particulate fluorides as part of the industrial process. From an early 
date Jones knows that these particles, carried by the air, will land on 
neighboring property, and in doing so will bring about a range of 
harms. 
 
 
 
 
 
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch.1, supra note 2, at 1. 
25 That is, they involve cases in which the ratio of externalized costs to benefits is high and transaction 
costs are low (e.g., most trespasses), or the ratio of externalized costs to benefits is high and 
transaction costs are high (e.g., nuisances). See Hylton, supra note 18, at 993. 
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 1, cmt. d, illus. 2-3. 
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In both examples the externalized costs of the activity, viewed generally, exceed 
externalized benefits by a substantial margin. In such cases strict liability acts as a 
corrective pricing mechanism, inducing actors to take into account the expected costs 
of their activity to others. Although the assumption of rational accounting may 
appear strained in the case of Wendy, the strict liability rules will most likely lead 
the Jones Company to scale back its activity to a level where the marginal benefit to 
Jones is equal to the marginal social cost of the activity. 
 
The typical case of trespass – Bill wanders on to Joe’s property and removes 
the shutters from his house – falls within this analysis. If the victim has a substantial 
damage claim, the cost of the defendant’s activity to him probably outweighs its 
benefits. Moreover, trespass doctrine is designed to induce actors to use the market 
in settings where transaction costs are low. The more extreme case of an actor who 
trespasses with an intent to harm – Bill wanders on to Joe’s property to throw rocks 
through his windows – is also easily in the same category. In the more extreme case 
of trespass with intent to harm, it is clear that as a general matter net external costs of 
the activity are substantial and the actor should be encouraged to bargain for his 
desired result. Courts often award punitive damages in these cases because they 
recognize that simply internalizing costs may not be enough; it is better to eliminate 
the activity entirely, which is the goal of overlapping criminal prohibitions.27 
 
The Comment to § 1 notes without attempting to explain several features of 
intentional tort doctrine that seem inconsistent with the broader scheme of intentional 
tort doctrine or tort doctrine in other areas. These features are easily explained by 
the framework of this paper. For example, consider the various doctrines requiring 
proof of more than an intent to bring about harm, the transferred intent rule, and the 
subordination of traditional negligence defenses under intentional tort doctrine. 
 
For several intentional torts, intent to bring about the harm is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for liability. Consider the torts of assault, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and loss of prospective economic advantage. 
Although the details of the rules differ in each case, each tort requires the plaintiff to 
prove a higher level of intent than merely intent to carry out the act leading to the 
harm. For example, assault doctrine requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant 
intended to harm or create the impression of impending harm. This goes beyond the 
trespass and battery rules, which require proof merely that the defendant intended to 
carry out his conduct. 
 
I think it is not hard to show that each one of the torts requiring proof of more 
than general intent essentially requires proof of specific intent, or intent to harm. 
This is obvious in the case of assault. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress requires proof that the defendant’s conduct was “outrageous.”28   No one has 
a good legal definition of outrageousness, but the purpose of the requirement is to 
 
 
27 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and The Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L. J. 421 
(1998). 
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 20, § 46. 
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distinguish ordinary insults from expression that would create significant distress in 
the average person. Such expression, it is reasonable to infer, must have been uttered 
with an intent to harm the listener. I could continue through the other torts in this 
category – e.g., malicious prosecution, interference with prospective economic 
advantage, and others – but in each case I am sure the argument would be the same, 
that the doctrine essentially requires proof of specific intent to harm. 
 
Why does the law governing assault, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and interference with prospective advantage require proof of specific intent 
to harm? The reason is that as a general rule the ratio of externalized costs to 
externalized benefits is less than one for these activities. Each involves a substantial 
intermingling of possibly harmful with beneficial activity. Assault cases, and those 
involving intentional infliction of emotional distress, often involve aspects of 
expression. As an activity, expression typically provides substantial external 
benefits. As John Stuart Mill argued, free expression enables the correction of false 
beliefs.29 From a better known economic perspective, expression is a public good in 
the sense that it can provide the same benefits to numerous consumers.30 Most 
economics textbooks explain that public goods should be subsidized, which is what 
the law does in effect by requiring plaintiffs to prove specific intent to harm. 
 
Transferred intent doctrine makes obvious sense once we view strict liability 
as controlling activity levels. It does not matter whether Wendy aimed to hit Bill or 
Joe with a rock. The transferred intent doctrine guarantees that Wendy will pay for 
the harm regardless of the identity of the intended victim. The aim is not to punish 
Wendy for desiring to hit Bill with a rock, but to give Wendy an incentive to “price 
out” her own potentially harmful conduct before acting. 
 
The subordination of traditional defenses, such as assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence, is also easy to understand when strict liability is viewed as a 
rule designed to channel liability toward activities that externalize far more costs 
than benefits, or far more costs than most activities. To allow a contributory 
negligence or assumption of risk defense for battery would relieve batterers of part of 
the cost of their activity, a partial subsidy. But there is no good argument for 
subsidizing battery. Where the harms outweigh the benefits, we should regulate the 
activity by making the actor pay the full costs. Even when the foreseeable harms are 
relatively small, we still want the actor to face the risk of paying the full costs, so 
that he understands that he should seek a consensual transaction from the victim. 
 
 
B. Negligence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport, ed., Hackett Publishing 1978)(1859). 
30 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE  297-98 (1981). 
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Since the Restatement tells us that the balancing test or Hand formula is 
clearly the dominant method of determining negligence,31 the main issue of interest 
is how one goes about inferring negligence. The balancing test balances the burden 
of precaution against the incremental expected harms in the absence of precaution. 
As Learned Hand put it, the balancing test compares B with PL, where B is the 
burden of precaution and PL is the (incremental) probability of harm (P) multiplied 
by the harm (L). 
 
There are, to be sure, several special tort doctrines that follow more or less 
directly from the balancing test. The “emergency rule” of Restatement § 7 
recognizes that in emergencies the actor may be especially prone to make mistakes in 
attempting to comply with the reasonable care standard, since an actor in an 
emergency may be too frightened or distracted to make roughly accurate guesses as 
to the magnitudes of B and PL. The rules governing the negligence of children also 
follow directly from the BPL test. Ordinarily, a child is held to the standard of a 
reasonably careful child of the same age, experience, and intelligence. This implies 
that adults must take extra care to avoid injuring a child, which follows from the 
balancing test because even when children are acting reasonably (given their 
capacities) the risk of injury (PL) is higher than in a setting with only adults. Since 
adults can observe and predict the harms associated with this higher level of risk, 
they must adjust their levels of care upward. Adults are relieved of this 
responsibility when children are engaged in adult activities, for in such cases adults 
generally cannot observe the higher level of risk. Most adults will assume that actors 
engaged in adult activities, such as driving, are adults. 
 
The balancing test is conducted from the perspective of the reasonable man. 
This forces a statistical averaging or objective approach to inferring negligence. 
There are several implications of this approach noted in the literature. Holmes, as 
usual the first to come to this issue, noted that the negligence test makes no special 
allowances for the awkward, the test “does not attempt to see men as God sees 
them.”32 People who have trouble complying with the conduct of the reasonable 
person, for unobservable reasons, are in effect subjected to strict liability. Holmes 
saw this problem as exposing a fundamental weakness in claims that negligence 
doctrine is consistent with moral theory. Mark Grady, more recently, has argued that 
the negligence test operates in effect as a strict liability rule in cases involving “non- 
durable” precaution.33 The reason is that people simply cannot be careful all of the 
time. Someone will slip up eventually, and competition will force you to take on 
some risk of error. While Holmes envisioned negligence falling unfairly across a 
population of different actors with randomly distributed abilities, Grady envisions 
the negligence rule falling unfairly over time against a single actor as he passes 
through random realizations of his own ability levels.   The averaging under the 
 
 
 
 
 
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 4, cmt. d. 
32 Holmes, supra note 3, at 108. 
33 Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 887 (1994). 
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balancing test also excludes certain desires or objectives,34 such as those of the 
motorist who likes to race, which some regard as supporting the moral theory of 
negligence doctrine. I might add to this the case in which the negligence rule fails to 
consider the ephemeral benefits or desires of the average actor, perhaps as another 
point on the side of the moral vision. 
 
The reasonable person test should be viewed as an inference rule, having 
nothing to do with the morality issue. The BPL test involves some components that 
are either unobservable or imperfectly observable to jurors. The most important one 
is the defendant’s burden of precaution, B. The jury cannot observe this quantity, 
and the defendant has every incentive to assert that it is extremely high. The jury 
does observe the general population distribution of B. Hence, in a rational inference 
system, the jury should tend to put a great deal of weight on the average drawn from 
the general distribution, unless the defendant can offer concrete proof that his burden 
of precaution is far above the average. It follows immediately from this that rules 
excluding unprovable claims of unusual awkwardness or unusual desires would be a 
part of the balancing test. The reasonable person test incorporates such rules. 
 
It is hard to distinguish how such a rational inference system would differ 
from one in which there is an alleged “hindsight bias.”35 Hindsight bias apparently 
occurs because people think things are more likely to happen once they happen. 
While that is true, the difficult part is determining whether this should be labeled as a 
bias. Bayesians will update their predictions of the probability an event will happen 
after it happens. This much of hindsight judgment is entirely rational and should not 
be treated as a type of cognitive bias. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to design a 
test that would distinguish Bayesian updating from an alleged hindsight bias. To this 
we should add the strategic problem referred to above; that juries must discount 
claims by the defendant that the probability of harm is extremely low, because they 
know that the defendant’s incentive is to lie. A rational jury will therefore put a 
great deal of weight on the Bayesian adjusted estimate of P rather than the 
defendant’s evidence of P. 
 
The class of inference rules also includes doctrines governing unreasonable 
conduct due to mental or emotional disability. Restatement § 9c says that “[u]nless 
the actor is a child, the actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in 
determining whether conduct is negligent.” The rationale follows from the foregoing 
argument. It is very hard to tell whether someone is too emotionally unstable or 
unintelligent to comply with the reasonable care standard. Even if such a defense 
were permitted, juries would discount defendants’ attempts to use it after its abuse 
became common knowledge. The defendant in Vaughan v. Menlove36 argued that 
the reasonable care standard is unfair and unpredictable from the perspective of an 
 
 
 
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch. 2, Reporter’s Note, at 62 (citing Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness 
and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 369 (1996).) 
35 Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 
Law & Hum. Behav. 89 (1995). 
36 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468 (1837) reprinted in 132 Eng. Rep. 490. 
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actor who is mentally incapable of complying. However, the uncertainty problem 
would be considerably worse if the disability defense were allowed. If juries did not 
discount the defense entirely, the reasonable care standard would become too 
uncertain to serve as a constraint on conduct. 
 
C. Duty 
 
The Restatement takes a rather vague and uncommitted stance on the duty 
issue. Restatement § 6 says explicitly that “[f]indings of no duty are unusual, and are 
based on judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy that justify 
the withholding of liability.”37 We are told in Comments c and d of areas of the case 
law in which the duty issue seems to be an appropriate area of concern. However, 
there is no discussion of underlying principles. The Reporter’s Note buries the duty 
issue even further, noting that “[m]odern scholars tend to classify the issue of the 
foreseeable plaintiff under the general heading of proximate causation.”38 
 
The Restatement’s discussion of duty illustrates the need for further 
development of the positive framework for tort doctrine and integration of that 
framework into the Restatement project. The duty doctrines are examples of 
channeling rules that allocate liability largely in response to activity level concerns. 
For example, consider the general rule that a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser, 
save that of intentionally or recklessly harming him. This rule is simply a 
complement of the strict liability rule imposed on trespassers. The strict liability rule 
deters or reduces the scale of trespassing as an activity. In order to accomplish this 
function, the rule must be joined by a complementary rule relieving the landowner of 
a duty to provide and care for the trespasser. This is the policy underlying the rule 
that a landowner has no duty to a trespasser. 
 
Consider the general rule that there is no duty to rescue. There are so many 
exceptions to this rule that one can fairly doubt whether there is any substance to the 
general rule at all. However, the rescue doctrine should be viewed as a rule that 
channels tort liability away from actors whose activities are not causally or 
probabilistically related to the victim’s harm. Generally, tort law imposes negligence 
liability only on those actors who should have foreseen the victim’s harm as a likely 
consequence of their activity. This is not the case in the rescue settings where no 
duty is found. A person reading a book on a beach does not foresee another person 
drowning as a result of his activity. 
 
Now one could argue that a duty to rescue would force the man on the beach 
to foresee the possible drowning accidents around him. But this would require him 
to be aware and prepared to react to the drowning risk at all times. Since the cost of 
complying with this expectation is so high, many potential rescuers would avoid the 
 
 
 
 
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), ch.2, supra note 2, § 6. 
38 Id. at § 6 reporters note cmt. a. 
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risk altogether and stay home.  Thus, as Landes and Posner recognized, the essential 
rationale for the rescue doctrine is based on its activity level effects.39 
 
Many scholars and courts treat duty issues as part of the proximate cause 
question today. This is a sensible approach, given that the function of proximate 
cause is to channel liability away from actors engaged in activities that are not 
causally or probabilistically related to the victim’s harm. However, this is an 
approach that creates some losses in doctrinal clarity. If channeling issues are dealt 
with as matters of duty, then they are matters of law, which courts will treat as 
important precedents. If, on the other hand, they are treated as matters of proximate 
cause, then they are primarily questions for the jury. As jury questions, they fail to 
create important rules to guide future courts. 
 
The question whether channeling issues should be dealt with under proximate 
cause or duty doctrine returns us to one of the important functions of inference rules. 
Inference rules provide predictability and stability to the law by preventing courts 
from giving weight to unverifiable defenses. Duty rules, in addition to serving the 
channeling function spelled out here, also serve the same function as inference rules, 
when compared to the alternative of proximate cause analysis. Duty rules are to 
some extent preferable to proximate cause rules, because they contribute to the 
predictability of legal doctrine. And if actors are supposed to comply with the tort 
rules, the courts should be aiming to state them with some degree of clarity. Thus, it 
should not be regarded as a matter of indifference whether questions of duty are dealt 
with as “duty rules” or as proximate cause rules. The more consistent and reliable 
duty doctrines (e.g., no duty to a trespasser) should be analyzed by courts under the 
heading of duty rather than proximate cause. 
 
 
D. Strict Liability 
 
 
Tort law includes several forms of liability labeled strict: liability for animals, 
abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, producer liability, vicarious liability. 
However, not all of these versions share similar doctrinal features. The first three 
have similar doctrines, and fall under the framework of this paper. Products liability 
includes two components referred to as strict liability: liability for manufacturing 
defects, and liability for defective designs. Liability for manufacturing defects is 
perhaps the only example in tort law of pure strict liability, in the sense that an injury 
caused by a manufacturing defect leads directly to liability. Design defect doctrine, 
though labeled strict liability, actually applies a type of negligence test to the design 
 
 
 
39 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: 
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Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 198-99 (1973) (noting difficulty of distinguishing easy, 
or cost-justified, rescue situations from difficult rescue situations). Given the high risk of error          
in any attempt to apply a negligence rule to rescue attempts, the effect of a negligence rule should be 
equivalent to that of a strict liability rule. 
18  
decision. Vicarious liability, as the Restatement Comment notes, requires proof of 
negligence against the agent.40 
 
I will focus here on liability for abnormally dangerous activities. 
Restatement (Third) § 21 defines an abnormally dangerous activity as follows: (1) 
the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even 
when reasonable care is exercise by all actors; and (2) the activity is not a matter of 
common usage. Restatement (Second) § 520 defines an abnormally dangerous 
activity by the following six factors: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some 
harm to the person, (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) 
inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which 
the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to 
the place where it is carried on and; (f) extent to which its value to the community is 
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
 
As between the two Restatement definitions, I find the Restatement (Second) 
§ 520 more informative, and more consistent with the framework of this paper. The 
first three factors of Restatement (Second) § 520 have been simplified and squeezed 
into the first factor of Restatement (Third) § 21 without loss of any significant parts. 
The first three factors signal the importance of residual risk in strict liability doctrine, 
i.e., the risk that remains once all actors are taking reasonable care. Strict liability 
doctrine, under the framework presented here, is largely concerned with correcting 
substantial imbalances in the exchange of residual harms. If the residual risk is not 
“highly significant,” then strict liability is probably not appropriate. The last three 
factors of Restatement (Second) § 520 are not really captured by the second factor of 
Restatement (Third) § 21. Restatement § 21 refers only to the common usage issue, 
while the last three factors of Restatement (Second) § 520 refer to common usage 
and the extent to which there is some reciprocity in the exchange of residual risks 
and benefits among adjacent activities. 
 
Restatement (Second) § 520 lays out a test that seems to guide courts in 
assessing the ratio of externalized costs and benefits, which is the general form of 
strict liability test suggested by the missing-markets framework of this paper. The 
first three requirements establish a threshold requirement that the residual risk (i.e., 
the risk externalized when actors are taking reasonable care) is substantial. The last 
three follow on with an important part of the test. If all of the last three factors are 
satisfied, we generally can be sure that there is a non-reciprocal exchange of risks 
between the defendant’s activity and others or that the defendant’s activity 
externalizes far more risk than benefit. Given this, it is appropriate to tax the activity 
with strict liability, in order to give the actor an incentive to reduce its scale closer to 
the optimal level (return to Figure 1) or to shift the activity to a different locale. 
 
The positive framework of this paper suggests that the more detailed test set 
out in § 520 is superior to that in § 21. Section 21’s reference to common usage does 
not guide the court toward making an effort to examine the degree of reciprocity in 
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the exchange of residual risks. Usually, if an activity is one of common usage there 
will be a roughly reciprocal exchange of residual risks. However, this may not 
always be the case. For example, the water reservoir in Rylands v. Fletcher41 may 
have been a relatively common, or at least not uncommon, feature in England during 
the 1800s.42 It would be easy to reach the conclusion that a reservoir externalizes far 
more non-reciprocated risk than benefit onto adjacent activities.43 However, it might 
have been difficult to say whether the reservoir was a matter of common usage. It is 
troubling to find that the most recent Restatement effort to codify the Rylands 
doctrine might have led to a different result if applied in the Rylands case. 
 
This criticism applies with greater force to Posner’s reduction, in Indiana 
Harbor, of § 520 to a single factor – whether the harm can be eliminated by 
reasonable care. If one were to apply this factor alone to the Rylands case, one might 
conclude that strict liability is inappropriate in that setting. After all, it would be a 
bit much to ask a reservoir owner to move it to another location, and it is hard to see 
how he could reduce the scale of his activity. Since the activity level responses 
induced by strict liability are minimal in the short run, and the harm in Rylands 
might have been reduced substantially through additional care, Posner’s test could 
easily lead to a different result in the Rylands case. 
 
In addition to suggesting that § 520 is superior to § 21 as a codification of 
Rylands doctrine, the theory of this paper provides a better explanation of Rylands, 
and its place in the broader scheme of tort doctrine, than any other theory of which I 
am aware. The various opinions in the Rylands litigation make no reference to 
whether the defendant’s reservoir was a matter of common usage. However, the 
opinions do stress the inequitable exchange of residual risks in Rylands and similar 
cases. Consider Justice Blackburn’s opinion in the first appeal: 
 
The general rule … seems on principle just. The person whose grass 
or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or 
whose mine is flooded by water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or 
whose cellar is invaded by filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose 
habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his 
neighbour’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; 
and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has 
brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, 
harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but 
which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s, 
should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does 
not succeed in confining it to his own property. 
 
 
 
 
 
41 Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). 
42 A. W. B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs, 13 J. Legal Stud. 209, 216-17 (1984). 
43 Id., at 218-19 (noting that dam failures were major disasters). See also, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
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Virtually all of the examples discussed in the Rylands opinions – cattle, fumes, water 
– were most likely matters of common usage at the time.   The judges in Rylands 
seemed to be concerned primarily with the inequitable allocation of residual risk. 
 
Of the other theories available, Fletcher’s reciprocal risk theory seems to also 
provide a good explanation of the Rylands doctrine.44 According to Fletcher, tort 
liability is based largely on whether the exchange of risk between two actors can be 
regarded as reciprocal or roughly equal. Where the exchange is roughly equal, the 
negligence rule applies; where the exchange is unequal, strict liability applies to the 
actor who externalizes the most risk. This theory has an appealing simplicity and 
seems to explain the Rylands case. However, Fletcher’s theory lacks a solid 
theoretical foundation, a problem that becomes obvious the moment you ask why 
reciprocal risk-exchange should matter. Moreover, because it lacks a good 
theoretical foundation, it is inadequate, without a good deal of extra work, to explain 
many of the simplest negligence cases. For example, medical malpractice cases 
involve a doctor, who throws a lot of risk onto a patient, who in turn throws virtually 
no risk onto the doctor. The negligence rule applies, even though there is an obvious 
imbalance in the exchange of residual risks. 
 
Having mentioned animals in the course of discussing the Rylands doctrine, I 
see little need here to explore in detail the implications of this paper’s framework for 
the Restatement provisions on liability for animals. Strict liability applies because of 
the inequitable exchange of residual risks. On the basis of this theory, it seems clear 
that the provisions regarding liability for animals can be treated as a special case of 
the Rylands doctrine. This is as it should be, since the Rylands opinions mention 
animals to illustrate the general argument for strict liability. 
 
 
V. Returning to the Restatement’s purpose 
 
 
The payoff from an extended positive framework is that it explains tort 
doctrine in detail, and suggests functional similarities among tort rules. The 
framework presented here solves the most important puzzle generated under the 
Holmes-Posner framework: the prevalence of the negligence rule. The framework 
also explains the doctrine governing “specific intent” (intent-to-harm) torts such as 
assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the importance of the 
distinction between general and specific intent torts, and its implications for punitive 
damages; the function, as well as the relative merits, of duty and proximate cause 
rules; and the specific contours of strict liability doctrines. These are all areas of tort 
doctrine that are either unexplained or insufficiently explained under the Holmes- 
Posner framework. The framework of this paper also extends our understanding of 
the reasonable-person standard and functionally related rules. 
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A detailed positive theoretical framework is useful to the Restatement project 
in explaining rules, ordering them by function, and avoiding mistakes in 
interpretation. There is always a choice in any project such as the Restatement 
whether to lay out the rules according to formal legal categories or to lay them out 
according to some notion of their functions. Since the Restatement of Torts has 
traditionally been laid out according to formal legal categories (intent, negligence, 
etc.), revisions should continue with this format. However, a better sense of the 
functional similarities among rules should enhance efforts to clarify by reducing the 
fragmentation or diffusion of legal concepts. It also helps avoid revising in the 
wrong direction. 
 
I think the framework here itself makes a case for incorporating positive 
theory as a central part of the Restatement project. The law changes over time, in 
response to changes in technology and preferences. It is important, in view of its 
fluidity, to get a glimpse of the underlying skeletal structure of legal doctrine, which 
is what positive theory aims to do. Of course, Langdell thought he was getting at the 
skeleton of the law too, but there is a big difference between positive theory, as 
understood today, and the Langdellian project. While the Langdellian approach aims 
to discover a core set of fundamental legal rules, which is a doubtful exercise, the 
positive theory approach aims to discover the functions of legal rules, and to work 
backwards toward a deeper understanding of rules from an understanding of their 
functions. The relative merits of these two approaches have been revealed over the 
past century. While the Langdellian approach has yielded no useful insights into tort 
doctrine, the positive theory approach, begun with Holmes’ decision to break from 
the Langdellian mold, has given us an enormously useful framework for 
understanding tort doctrine. 
 
Moreover, positive theory constrains “restaters” (everyone involved in the 
Restatement project) of the law in a manner that enhances the value of the 
Restatement. It is much harder to push the law in a novel, unwarranted direction 
when one is also constrained to remain consistent with a broader theoretical 
framework. This enhances the long-term value of the Restatement by dampening 
opportunities to use it as a launching pad for legal reform efforts. This, in turn, 
benefits “restaters” by reducing incentives for legal pressure groups to insert 
themselves into the Restatement project.45 
 
VI. . Conclusion 
 
The positive tort theory framework of Holmes and Posner is largely 
successful, though lacking sufficient detail to explain many tort doctrines. I have 
extended the framework here and applied it to the Restatement (Third) of Tort Law. 
The extended framework explains tort doctrine at a highly detailed level, which is 
important if positive theory is to be useful to the Restatement project. 
 
 
45 Of course, one approach to this problem is to always have highly-respected Reporters of the caliber 
of Professor Schwartz, in order to discourage pressure group efforts. But I would prefer to design a 
system that minimizes the risk of pressure group influence. 
